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THE RAZOR'S EDGE OF HUMAN BONDING:
ARTIFICIAL FATHERS AND SURROGATE
MOTHERS
GEORGE P. SMITH, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
While current estimates approximate the total number of issue
conceived by artificial insemination as being 250,000I-with yearly
estimates ranging from 10,0002 to 20,0003-several hundred surro-
gate mothers4 have been or, are currently, thought of as serving in
this capacity here in the United States.5 From reading the Biblical
tale of Sarah directing her husband, Abraham, to conceive a child
with the assistance of her handmaiden, Hagar, it is evident that the
practice of surrogate motherhood has existed for years. 6
For many, infertility, sterility, genetic incompatabilities and/or
physical handicaps do not in any way appear to diminish the need
for having children in order to have what is regarded as a complete
marriage. Adoption is often a long, complicated procedure lasting
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America; B.S., Indiana University,
1961; J.D.. Indiana University at Bloomington School of Law, 1964; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1975.
1. Annas, Artfcial Insemination.- Beyond the Best Interests of the Donor, 9 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1979, at 14. See Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly Artificial
Insemination and The Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 133 (1968).
2. Id.
3. W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 121 (2d ed. 1976).
4. Simply defined, a surrogate mother is a woman who contracts with a man to be
impregnated through artificial insemination. She additionally contracts to carry the issue
of this artificial union and to relinquish the child and all parental rights, after delivery, to
the biologic father. More often than not, this biologic father is married to an infertile
woman who hopes to adopt the child in the course of time. Paper presented by Parker,
The Psychology of Surrogate Motherhood: An Updated Report of a Longitudenial Pilot
Study 1, Interdisciplinary Symposium on Surrogate Mothers, Wayne State University,
Detroit, Mich. (Nov. 20, 1982).
5. Interview by Jane Pauley with Lori B. Andrews, Esq., Today Show, NBC Net-
work, New York City, New York (May 1, 1981). See generally, Andrews, Embryo Tech-
nology, PARENTS MAG. 63 (May, 1981). The first recorded incident of a surrogate
motherhood birth took place in San Francisco, California, on September 6, 1976. N.P.
KEANE & D.C. BREo, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 33 (1981).
6. Krucoff, Private Lives.- The New Surrogates, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1980, at B5,
col. 2.
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anywhere from four to seven years.7 For many couples, continuation
of the bloodline is of central importance. With the assistance of sur-
rogates, such continuation can be achieved anywhere from but a
year and a half to two years. Married women who share this view
have been known to state: "I want my husband's baby even if some-
one else carries it."8 It is astonishing and incongruous to realize that,
with children in such great demand for some, there presently exists
some four hundred thousand or more unwanted children in foster
care arrangements. 9 Tragically, time, circumstances and socio-eco-
nomic conditions often change parental attitudes after an infant is
added to the family unit: the sought after and prized child all too
often becomes an unwanted liability.
An early 1969 Harris opinion survey of some one thousand, six
hundred adults from throughout the country concerning advances
and applications of the "new" developing biology, revealed a fasci-
nating attitudinal profile. Nineteen percent of all interviewed ap-
proved of AID, or heterologous, donor insemination, while fifty-six
percent disapproved of the process.' 0 Where the sole method to
achieve conception is by use of the AID procedure, that is, obtaining
semen from a donor and injecting by syringe into the woman's re-
productive tract, thirty-five percent of those interviewed approved of
the technique. Forty-nine percent of the men interviewed in the sur-
vey agreed in principle with homologous insemination, that is, taking
semen from the husband. Sixty-two percent of the women inter-
viewed approved of pregnancies achieved by the artificial injection
of their husbands' semen where physical or psychological difficulties
precluded fertilization through sexual intercourse.'"
7. Adoption and Foster Care 1975. Hearings on Baby Selling Before the Subcomm.
on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1975). The four to seven year time period refers to the normal waiting period for
a healthy, white child. Because of lesser demand, adoption times are shorter for children
who are older, have physical or emotional disabilities, or are non-white. Krucoff, supra
note 6.
8. Supra note 6.
9. J. WESTMAN, CHILD ADVOCACY 276 (1979).
10. There are two principal ways undertaken for human artificial insemination:
homologous and heterologous. When semen is secured from a wife's husband and artifi-
cially injected by instrument into her reproductive tract, the process is termed homolo-
gous or AIH. When semen is obtained from a third-party donor, the process is referred
to as heterologous or AID. Artificial insemination, as a technique for improved animal
husbandry, occurred as early as 1322, while the first reported case of human artificial
insemination (AIH) was in 1799. Not until the early part of the twentieth century were
recorded instances of donor insemination observed. Smith, supra note 1, at 128-29.
11. Smith, For Unto Us Is Born a Child-Legally, 56 A.B.A. J. 143 (1970). See
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Another sampling of public opinion occurred in 1978, shortly
after the first recorded success of "Baby Louise Brown's" birth in
England, when Gallup conducted a poll to determine American atti-
tudes concerning the procedure of in vitro fertilization. 12 The poll
revealed public approval of the procedure by a two-to-one margin.
A majority stated they would be willing to follow this procedure if
they were childless and wished to have offspring. Nationwide, fifty-
three percent would undergo this medical intervention and thirty-six
would not. 13 While no sophisticated studies have been conducted
regarding the public's acceptance or rejection of surrogate mother-
hood, there is every indication that it will not be universally accepted
or rejected. Rather, a case-by-case response will be forthcoming
with the reasons for the initial action being carefully scrutinized.
This article will examine the plight of the artificial father and
surrogate mother by focusing on how the law views artificial insemi-
nation. From this focus, the author will explore alternative re-
sponses for dealing with problems involving surrogate mothers,
donor insemination, and infertility and show their symbiotic, if not
direct, relation to the problem of infertility.
II. THE ARTIFICIAL FATHER
Generally in dealing with heterologous artificial insemination
cases (AID), the donor is unknown. The major issues involve
whether the putative father, (i.e., the husband of the artificially in-
seminated mother), becomes the legal father of the artificially con-
ceived child and whether the wife has committed adultery by
participating in the act with or without her husband's consent.
In 1948, the New York Supreme Court recognized that a wo-
man artificially inseminated by a third-party donor-with her hus-
also, Brody, Sperm Found Especially Vulnerable to Environment Miscarriages, Defects,
Infertility Linked to Damage by Toxins, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1981, at Cl, col. 5.
12. In vitro fertilization is the procedure employing a laparoscope that seeks to
remove eggs from the ovaries of a female and fertilize them outside the body. Once
successful fertilization is achieved, anywhere from a 16- to 32-cell stage being recorded,
the embryo is then implanted in the uterus of the female. See Weintraub, First Test- Tube
Baby Born in British Hospital, Wash. Post, July 15, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
13. G. GALLUP, 5 THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX, No. 161 (Dec. 1978).
Interestingly, a 1978 Harris survey of 1,501 women found widespread approval
(66%) of in vitro fertilization by those women who actually planned to have children.
When given the option of adoption, more than twice as many chose adoption (57%) as in
vitro fertilization (21%). A surprising 63% wanted in vitro fertilization banned totally
until further research indicated whether the intervention would increase the likelihood of
birth defects. R.H. BLANK, THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENETIC TECH-
NOLOGY 152 (1981).
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band's consent, gave birth to a legitimate child.' 4 The woman's
husband was "entitled to the same rights as that acquired by a foster
parent who has formally adopted a child, if not the same rights as
those to which a natural parent under the circumstances would be
entitled." 15
With the case of Gursky v. Gursky 16 in 1963, however, a New
York trial court held that even though a husband consents to his
wife's use of AID, the child is nonetheless, illegitimate. In 1968, a
considerably more enlightened and contemporary California
Supreme Court in People v. Sorensen 17 rejected the Gursky thesis
and held that a husband who gives his consent to his wife's use of
AID intervention cannot disclaim his lawful fatherhood of the child
for the purpose of child support.' 8 The court construed a state penal
nonsupport statute to incorporate liability of a consenting father of
the AID child-finding a genetic relationship, as such, unnecessary
in order to establish the required father-child relationship.' 9
A considerable degree of sophistication was shown by the New
York Supreme Court in 1973 with its holding in Adoption of Anony-
mous. 20 Instead of adhering blindly to Gursky, the court found a
strong state policy favoring legitimacy. Furthermore, the court ac-
knowledged that a child born of consensual artificial insemination
by a donor, accomplished during a valid marriage, was legitimate
and thereby entitled to enjoy all rights and privileges of a child who
was conceived in a natural way by the same marriage.
Since Sorensen and Anonymous, a growing number of states
have passed legislation making legitimate the offspring of AID when
the husband consents to the procedure.2' These judicial and legisla-
tive developments indicate clearly that both branches of government
14. Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391-92 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
15. Id.
16. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
17. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). See also Smith, supra note
II.
18. 68 Cal. 2d at 283-84, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
19. Id.
20. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
21. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West
1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69f (1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 1973); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1981); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75 (McKinney 1982-83);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552 (West 1982-83); OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.243 (1981); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 12.03 (Vernon 1977); VA.
CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(1) (West 1983-84).
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no longer equate AID with adultery as they once did,2 2 and may
even signal the public's willingness to sanction more startling genetic
developments.23
Recently, a New Jersey court held that an unmarried woman,
who conceived a child through sperm artificially donated by a
friend, was required to allow custodial and visitation rights for the
donor despite her wishes, but consistent with what was perceived as
the best interests of the child. Even though refusing to take a specific
position on the propriety of the use of artificial insemination be-
tween unmarried persons, the court recognized the donor as the natu-
ral father, and imposed upon him the responsibility to support and
maintain the child.2 4
Today, with the social and legal recognition of equality of rights
for women, and of their reproductive autonomy granted by the
United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,25 the issue of the ne-
cessity of a husband's consent for an act to be performed on his
wife's body has become less significant. Nonetheless, it is to be
hoped that married women who contemplate offering to become sur-
rogate mothers, or submit to AID for their personal benefit or desire
to have a child, will do so only after consultation with their hus-
bands. Failure to disclose such acts may be tantamount to deceit.2 6
22. See Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1921); Doombos v.
Doombos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (unreported decision of Super. Ct. Cook County, Iln., Dec.
13, 1954) (held that use of AID without a husband's consent was adultery). In MacLen-
nan v. MacLennan, 1958 Sess. Cas. 105, decided in Scotland, AID was recognized as
being an adulterous act. And in England, in a 1949 case, a marriage was annulled, and
the issue born from the use of an homologous insemination (by the husband, himself, not
a donor) were held to be illegitimate. L. v. L., [1949] 1 All. E.R. 141.
23. Smith, The Medicolegal Challenge of Preparing for a Brave Yet Somewhat
Frightening New World, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 9 (Apr. 1977). See also Smith, Manipulating
the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976); Smith, supra
note 1; Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artfcial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331 (1980).
Neither the surrogate mother nor the artificial father/donor participates in any physical
acts of sexual intercourse. In those cases where a wife gives her consent to a surrogate
mother arrangement or a husband consents to his wife's participation in donor insemina-
tion (AID), there is no basis for considering the fertilization techniques used in either
procedure to effect a pregnancy as adulterous. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate
Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147, 151-52.
24. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977). See Smith, .4 Close
Encounter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemination and an Enlightened Judiciary, 17 J.
FAM. L. 41 (1978); Erickson, Contracts to Bear 4 Child, in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SO-
CIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 98 (G. Smith ed. 1982).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. In New York, it is provided by statute that a written consent must be executed
by a married woman seeking to be artificially inseminated and by her husband if the
issue therefrom is to be considered legitimate. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
1977). See also CAL. CIv. CODE, § 7005 (West 1975).
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III. DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY V. THE RIGHT TO KNOW
A rather interesting and far-reaching precedent in the field of
adoption law could, if construed broadly, seriously jeopardize donor
secrecy in AID cases. District of Columbia Superior Court Judge
Greene recently ruled that a twenty-two year old mother of two liv-
ing in Takoma Park, Maryland, who was adopted as a child, should
be granted permission to see her sealed birth records and thus learn
the identities of her natural parents.27 The plaintiff in this case as-
serted her "basic right" to know her total historical identity, and also
to discover whether hereditary diseases or other health problems
were a part of her genetic inheritance. 28
A comparable argument can obviously be made by the progeny
of AID. The argument for disclosure would gain even more persua-
siveness in light of recent findings in the New England Journal of
Medicine.29 Statistics from a recent study showed that sperm from
one donor had in fact been used to produce fifty children and thus
raised the very real danger of accidental incest among offspring who
have the same father. 30 The article also recorded the sloppiness of
some doctors in failing to screen genetically the donors who partici-
pate in AID procedures. A mere twenty-nine percent of the doctors
tested the donors of semen-and then primarily for communicable
diseases. Most recipients were inseminated twice per cycle. Seven-
teen percent of the physicians used the same donor for a given recip-
ient, and thirty-two percent used multiple donors within a single
cycle. Only thirty-seven percent kept records on children, and only
thirty percent kept records on donors. The identity of donors usually
was carefully guarded to ensure privacy in order to avoid legal
complications. 3 1
27. Whitaker, Birth Data Ruled Open to Adoptee, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1979, at Cl,
col. 5.
28. The AID child's legitimate expectations and rights are underscored when a full
disclosure process of donor identity is advocated. And, the gratification of the participat-
ing couples' wish for parenthood is de-emphasized and challenged by efforts at full dis-
closure. In cases of this nature, it is almost impossible to balance the established rights of
the parents and the donor against the wishes, desires and assertions of a "basic right" to
know one's full identity made by a child of AID. R. ScoTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 208
(1981).
29. Currie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice ofArtificial Insemination by
Donor in the US, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (Mar. 15, 1979).
30. Id. at 587.
31. Id at 588; cf. infra note 46. The principal complication would be a possible
claim being asserted (with consequent adverse publicity) that the donor should share in
the expenses of raising the child or confer testamentary rights of inheritance upon the
child. See Waddington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64
[Vol. 5:639
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Of seven hundred eleven physicians likely to perform artificial
insemination by donors surveyed to determine their current prac-
tices, four hundred seventy-one responded, and three hundred sev-
enty-nine reported that they performed this procedure. They
accounted for approximately three thousand five hundred seventy-
six births by this means in 1977. In addition to treating infertility,
twenty-six percent of these physicians used the procedure to prevent
transmission of a genetic disease, and ten percent used it for single
women. Donors of semen were primarily from universities, were
only superficially screened for genetic diseases, and were then
matched phenotypically to the recipient's husband.32
Suppose a donor of semen, at age thirty-four, discovers that he
is a carrier of the congenital abnormality-Huntington's chorea. 33
His bodily movements become involuntary and his mental abilities
become progressively disoriented. Death is certain. Realizing that
he was a donor of semen at age twenty-one when he was a law
school student, he approaches the physician who administered the
artificial intervention and advises him of his condition. The physi-
cian advises, regretably, that his records of the insemination are in-
complete. Sensing a grave responsibility, he seeks to learn the
identity of those children whom he fathered artificially. He wishes
to provide some type of financial assistance for his offspring and/or
make provision in his estate for them before he -dies. Quaere:
Should a court of law consider a best interest of the child test, an
average ordinary donor's wishes under similar circumstances stan-
dard, or a best interest of society test, in ruling on a resolution of this
dilemma? If a court-ordered investigation discloses the donor's is-
sue, should they be told of the situation without a revelation of their
donor-father's identity? Does the donor in such a hypothetical case
as this have a right to know the identity of his progeny even though
they were conceived artificially? Why should not the same right to
know be provided the donor-in cases of this nature-as the
adopted child is being given in some jurisdictions to learn the iden-
tity of its birth parents? Even without legal validation of the right to
Nw. L. REV. 777 (1970); Fitzgerald v. Rueckl, RPTR. H.R.L., Jan. 1979, (Nev.) at II-A-2.
There has been little real or sustained outrage expressed over the maintenance of secrecy
in the adoption for fear of incestuous marriages. Arguably in AID cases, if and when
donor choice is conditioned upon an effort to discover, by screening, hereditarily trans-
missible defects of donors, the chances of genetic defects being transmitted through any
who might, by chance, intermarry is minimized to an appreciable degree. Waddington,
supra, at 805.
32. Supra note 29, at 585-87.
33. See generally G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 10-11 (1981).
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know genetic lineage, all too often independent investigatory means
are employed and the missing identity established.
Provisions within the Uniform Parentage Act provide that all
records involving AID interventions are to be kept "confidential and
in a sealed file." Inspection of records is only sanctioned when a
court order acknowledges the existence of "good cause."' 34 By draw-
ing upon analogous right-to-know parental-identity cases arising in
regular adoption areas, "good cause", in order to discern the identity
of a donor in artificial insemination cases, could be determined to
exist not only for reasons of obtaining complete medical information
regarding the child's donor-father; but for additional reasons such
as: allowing the AID child to resolve questions of identity and pro-
mote social adjustment; establishing a bond of love; 35 promoting a
wish to be of genuine assistance and support to a biological family
unit;36 and determining if the rules of intestate succession were
applicable. 37
The right to know parental lineage has received recent federal
attention. Efforts were undertaken initially by Senator Carl Levin of
Michigan in the second session of the 96th Congress to amend The
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act
of 1978 to provide for a national computerized adoption identifica-
tion center. This proposed legislation was entitled The Adoption
Identification Act of 1980.38 The specific purpose of the legislation
was to provide a system whereby the natural parents, siblings, or
34. These provisions of Section 5 of The Uniform Act, have, in essence, been
adopted by the following states:
CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(a) (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106(1) (1977); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45-69(h) (1975); KAN. STAT. § 23-130 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
106 (1975); N.Y. CITY HEALTH CODE § 21.07 (1959); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 553 (1974);
OR. REV. STAT. § 677.365(3) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (1976); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-2-103(a) (1978).
See Note, The Uniform Parentage Act. What It Will Mean for the Putative Father in
Calfornia, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 191 (1976).
35. In re Adoption of Female Infant, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2311 (1979); In re
Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 232 S.E.2d 479 (1977).
36. In reAnn CarolS., 172 N.Y.L.J. 31, Aug. 13, 1974, at 12, col. 6.
37. Spillman v. Parker, 332 So. 2d 573 (La. Ct. App. 1976). See Waddington,
Art~fcial Conception.- The Challengefor Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465 (1983); Annas,
Artffcial Insemination: Beyond The Best Interests of the Donor, 9 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Aug. 1979, at 14; Smith, Artificial Insemination: Disclosure Issues, 11 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87 (1979).
38. 126 CONG. REC. S2561 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1980). It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on Child and
Human Development where it subsequently died. See also, 126 CONG. REC. S3660
(daily ed. Apr. 15, 1980) (statement of Sen. Levin).
[Vol. 5:639
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other natural relative of an adoptee can locate each other through a
centralized computer system. 39 The Center, which was to be estab-
lished within the former Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (now Department of Health and Human Services), would have
been tied to voluntary participation by all involved parties. 40 State
participation through the development of state computer centers was
provided. 4'
In essence, a natural parent, a sibling or other natural relative or
offspring would have submitted an application to a computerized
identification center thereby initiating the locating process. The ap-
plication would then have been programmed a national or state
computer to match the parent, offspring, sibling, or other relative.
All subjects fitting the proffle of the submitted data were to have
been printed out and made available to the particular agency in-
volved with the follow-up procedure. There was a further provision
for additional research and actual interviewing to determine conclu-
sively whether the subjects match. Storage of such computer infor-
mation was to have been guaranteed for ten years. If no successful
match were made within this time, the proposed Act provided for a
renewal of the programmed application for another ten-year period.
Senator Levin, in proposing his legislation, and re-introducing it
in the first session of the 97th Congress, 42 was careful to state that it
would allow adoptees and birth parents to communicate only where
there existed mutual interest in communicating; thus any intrusion
into the life of either party or any prospective violation of constitu-
tional privacy rights would be avoided.43 No action of any nature
could be taken by the center unless and until both the adoptee and
his or her natural relatives independently made arrangements with
the center.4
39. Id. §301.
40. Id. § 304.
41. Id.
42. Supra note 33.
43. On April 2, 1980, Senate Resolution 401 was introduced by Senator John
Tower expressing disapproval of the proposed legislation which would
require either automatic opening at the request of an adult adoptee of confiden-
tial birth records, court records, and adoption agency records and require agen-
cies to notify adult adoptees that a birth parent desires to meet the adoptee even
if the adoptee had not expressed a desire to meet with his birth parents.
126 CONG. REC. S3469 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1980). S989 is the number of Senator Levin's
Bill that he re-introduced, with some slight modification, in the First Session of the 97th
Congress. This, too, died in Committee and was not introduced again. Efforts are cur-
rently being made by Senator Levin's staff to draft a compromise bill.
44. 126 CONG. REC. S3660 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1980) (statement of Sen. Levin).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
As the courts begin to recognize "a best interest of the child
test"45 in deciding vexatious cases involving artificial insemination, it
would surely appear that where genetic heritage is brought into
question concerning the health and well-being of an AID child, the
confidential files (V such are maintained) of a participating physician
to an AID intervention, should be examined by a judge in camera
and, where necessary, with the assistance of a geneticist. Although a
strong argument against disclosure of the donor's identity can be
made,46 the exigencies and circumstances of each case should be
considered. And, where the utility of the good in maintaining the
confidentiality of the donor's identity is outweighed by the gravity of
the "harm"47 that will arise as a consequence of disclosure, then the
veil of confidentiality should be pierced.
Greater safeguards must be undertaken in order to preserve the
integrity and value of artificial insemination as a medico-legal pro-
cess. If physicians are not sufficiently careful in their supervision
and administration of the AID process, then the state must act in
order to guarantee higher standards of professional care and compe-
tence. When a physician is negligent in properly screening prospec-
tive donors for artificial insemination, and a genetic abnormality
45. This was clearly the standard enunciated in C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160,
167, 377 A.2d 821, 825 (1977). See Smith, supra note 24.
46. P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 202 (1977).
47. The Currie-Luttrel article cites to carelessness in recordkeeping by doctors, see
supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text, thus, the statement " f the records are main-
tained." The harms of disclosure would be headed by perhaps a dwindling of the number
of donors because they would fear financial demands of support would be made against
them. Reilly, supra note 46, at 202. Severe psychological damage could be done to a
child born of an AID process where an acknowledgment was made that his or her mother
achieved conception from "the scientific placement in her cervix of thawed sperm from a
donor whose identity can never be recalled or learned." R. SCor, THE BODY As PROP-
ERTY 208 (1981). Other arguments against disclosure would point to the fact that while
in a conventional adoption, for example, both parents enjoy the same relationship to the
adopted child, in an AID case, one parent (e.g., the social father) is at a decided disad-
vantage which could lead to undesirable repercussions inside and outside the family.
Additional reasons for maintaining the confidentiality of the process would be: the easier
nature of the matter for all concerned;
the (remote) possibility that the husband is the father, and to rule this out, the
child would have to be given information of extreme intimacy, e.g., that the
husband was wholly sterile or impotent; and the artificial nature of the concep-
tion is both difficult to explain and difficult to accept, particularly for a
child. ...
Id See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618 (1979);
Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1980).
[Vol. 5:639
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thus passes undetected to the issue, the physician must always be
held liable for the consequences of his error.
In addition to continued judicial activism, legislative implemen-
tation should be sought by creating presumptions at law of the legiti-
macy of issue born of consensual AID and thus clarifying both the
legal rights and duties of the husband. To the extent that greater
confidentiality of donor records would be strengthened, additional
adoptions of the Uniform Parentage Act should be advocated. 48
V. THE SURROGATE MOTHER-A PROFILE
The surrogate mother has been regarded correctly as the female
counterpart to AID.49 This concept embraces several processes of
surrogate parenthood. One is the embryo implant in which a mar-
ried woman's eggs are fertilized by her husband's semen in vitro and
then implanted in specific human female carriers or "incubators".
Another process might be the simple use of semen from a married
woman's husband and the insertion of that semen into a female do-
nor or surrogate who will, under a bilateral contract for services ren-
dered, carry the issue to term and, after birth, release all her rights to
the child by allowing adoption by the biological father and putative
mother. Additional situations might arise in which maternally car-
ried dominant genetic disorders exist; where a married woman's eggs
would not accept fertilization; or where ovarian failures would arise
and prevent the woman from conceiving but which would not pre-
clude her from carrying another woman's embryo. 0 Thus, a reverse
surrogate mother situation would exist where a married man's semen
was used, in vitro, to fertilize another woman's eggs-with the em-
bryo then being implanted into the married man's spouse.
The attitudes that prompt a woman to become a surrogate
mother have been isolated to three or four. Some women possess
either a sentimental or a maternal instinct, or a fascination with hav-
ing a child. Others feel a sense of altruism which advances a wish to
help others experience that which has been a part of the surogate's
48. The Uniform Parentage Act has been adopted in but eight jurisdictions:
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1973);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-.54 (West 1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§40-6-101 to -131 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-10 to -26
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010 to .905 (1983); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -
120 (1977).
49. R. BLANK, THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENETIC TECHNOLOGY
68 (1981). See also G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 110, 124, 125 (1981).
50. Id
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life. Still others have cited a need for money as a reason for seeking
the status of surrogate motherhood. 5'
VI. POLICY ISSUES-LEGALITY OF THE BARGAIN
A number of vexatious policy issues are inherent in any consid-
eration of surrogate motherhood. Some issues may be resolved now,
others must await the test of time to be both sharpened and clarified
before a resolution will emerge.
If an illegal performance promised bilaterally or unilaterally is
regarded as being heinous, criminal or immoral to a high degree,
courts normally will not enforce the promise that accompanies such
performance. 52 Before such drastic judicial action is taken, however,
the court will give due consideration to the degree of the offense, the
51. Mann, Surrogate Motherhood" The Inevitable Conflict, Wash. Post, Mar. 25,
1981, at Cl, col. 1; Bumiller, Mothersfor Others, Wash. Post, Mar. 9, 1983, at BI 1, col. 5;
Krucoff, Focus.- The Surrogate Baby Boom, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1983, at C5, cols. 2 and
5. Regardless of the motivations behind a woman's choice to become a surrogate mother,
her fee determination may be based upon other considerations. One woman explained
how she arrived at her fee this way:
Most of the women charge $10,000 ... but because of my educational back-
ground and other qualifications, [my psychologist and I] felt I could charge
slightly more. I was thinking originally of going for $15,000 but [we] felt that I
may be pricing myself out of the market. So I felt $12,000 was a safer figure,
because I didn't want to charge a tremendous fee and end up not getting
anything.
Bumiller, supra, at B 11, col. 6. See also Harris, Stand-In Mother-Maryland Woman to
Bear Childfor Couple, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1980, at 1, col. 3. This article recounts how a
single twenty-year old "fallen-away" Catholic acted in her role as a surrogate mother.
On the September 3, 1981, NBC "Today Show," Phil Donahue interviewed a surrogate
mother volunteer who was currently enrolled in law school and in addition to wanting a
"body experience" also needed the money (in the range of $10,000) in order to help
finance her law school education. During the course of the interview, information was
presented that also showed some surrogate mothers respond to the "call" because of a
desire to either make up or atone for a previous abortion in which they participated. Cf
Krucoff, supra note 60, at B5, col. 2.
52. A. CORBIN, ON CONTRACTS § 1522 (1962). Six considerations should be taken
into account in both designing and reaching a surrogate mother arrangement: an ac-
knowledgment that the husband and wife seeking the contract will pay the surrogate
mother a sum of money in consideration for her promise to bear and deliver the hus-
band's child through an act of artificial insemination; statements detailing the fact that a
licensed physician will perform the artificial insemination on the surrogate (and that,
where appropriate, genetic screening will be utilized), that prior to the infant's delivery,
the genetic father will file proper notice of intent to claim paternity; that the same genetic
father will formally acknowledge the paternity of the child in question once born; that
the surrogate acknowledges the fact that the donor-husband is the real, genetic father of
the infant in question; and, finally, a statement by the surrogate that she will consent to
the adoption of the infant by the real father and his wife. N.P. KEANE & D.C. BREO,
supra note 5, at 117. Various model forms used in a surrogate arrangement are to be
found at pages 270-305. Id.
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extent of public harm involved if the bargain is recognized as valid,
and the nature of the moral quality of the conduct of the parties to
the bargain in light of current community standards. 53 Obviously, as
times change, so too does the public policy relevant to the particular
issue under consideration or in controversy. 54 Public policy in this
context may be defined simply as a legal principle which declares an
act either to be unlawful (i.e., that which promotes corruption or im-
morality) or which has a "tendency" to be injurious to either the
welfare, health, or morality of the public.55
A number of states make it a crime to pay anything of value to a
parent in consideration for obtaining consent to adopt or obtain cus-
tody of a child and impose a heavy penalty or imprisonment for vio-
lation thereof.56 In this way, some deterrent exists to prevent
extensive "black market" operations in adoptions. 57 Since the legal-
ity of a contract is tested by, and depends upon the place where it is
made, 58 a jurisdiction having such a law would hold a contract be-
tween a husband and wife with a surrogate mother, in which the
latter relinquished her parental rights to an infant born of such a
contract for subsequent adoption by the natural father and putative
mother, to be illegal and thus invalid. The bargain is an adoption
contract. Now, if this same contractual relation is viewed as a con-
tract to bear a child, less objection and greater acceptance of the con-
tract, itself, should be recognized simply because the purchaser is the
natural father of the child. With such a consideration, fears of com-
mercialization become less worrisome as a competing or undermin-
ing factor over the interests of the child or the biological mother.59
53. A. CORBIN, supra note 52, § 1534.
54. Id § 1315.
55. 15 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1745, n. I (1972).
56. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 181, 273(a) (West 1970); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.590
(1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (1980 Supp.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West
1984). See also Mathews, Surrogate Motherhood Becoming an American Growth Indus-
try, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1983, at A2, col. 1.
57. See, e.g., Adoption Hotline Inc. v. State, 385 So. 2d 682 (C.D.C.A. Fla. 1980);
Comment, Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to appear in the Con-
troversy over Gray Market Allocations? 18 DUESQUENE L. REV. 629 (1980); Comment,
Moppets on the Market: The Problem of UnregulatedAdoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950).
58. Supra note 54, § 1792.
59. ERICKSON, Contracts to Bear a Child, in I ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHAL-
LENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 100 (G. Smith ed. 1982). A contract to carry a child
also involves a direct social benefit otherwise not available by other means; specifically,
the contract parents are enabled to obtain a child which is biologically that of the hus-
band. Id A type of sex discrimination violative as such of the equal protection clause
might be proven owing to the fact of the disparate treatment, re the acknowledged pay-
ment, of donors of semen surrogate fathers for their services for artificial insemination
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Interestingly, an unmarried man would encounter even less legal en-
tanglement in dealing with a surrogate. Since no wife would be in-
volved, it would be unnecessary for a man to adopt his own child.
He would simply pay the surrogate without risk and, as natural fa-
ther of the child, take custody upon birth without any formal adop-
tion procedure being required.60
Perhaps the easiest way in which to avoid the issue of illegality
surrounding contracts to adopt a child or to bear one would be to
have the contracting parents either make a simple gift, 6 1 conditional
or absolute,62 or a voluntary declaration of trust to the surrogate
mother.63
VII. PRESUMPTIONS OF PATERNITY
The Uniform Parentage Act, although adopted in only eight
states,64 presents an initial obstacle to the establishment of paternity
in surrogate contract situations. Section five of the Act controls the
use of artificial insemination and provides: "The donor of semen
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of
a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if
he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived. ' '65
While it appears rather obvious that this provision was crafted in
order to protect anonymous AID donors from all legal responsibility
for those children fathered as a consequence of their donations of
semen, if the provision is adopted in toto this language could well
establish a difficulty for the real father under a surrogate contract to
establish either paternity or to assert parental rights, such as
visitation.
Children born of a validated marital union are presumed to be
and the questioned (e.g., illegal) payment to women who act as surrogate mothers. Pro-
hibitive statutes of this nature for prospective surrogate mothers might also be held to be
void for the vagueness of their purposes. And, finally, statutes similar to the one in
Michigan, infra note 84, could be attacked as constituting a denial of due process princi-
pally because no standards are set that specify criteria used by a court in order to allow
approval or disapproval of various charges and fees set in certain adoption procedures.
Keane, supra note 23, at 166. See Comment, Surrogate Motherhood in California: Legis-
lative Proposals, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341 (1981).
60. Krucoff, Private Lives: The New Surrogate, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1980, at B5,
col. 2.
61. W. RAUSHENBUSH, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.1 (3d ed. 1975).
62. Id § 7.13.
63. Id § 7.21.
64. Supra note 48.
65. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979).
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the legitimate issue of that union.66 All of the states have-regard-
less of their adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act-recognized this
presumption. Thus, if a surrogate is married, the issue she bears will
be presumed, unless rebutted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to
be the legitimate child or herself and her husband and not of the
artificial donor of the sperm. If the donor or biological father
brought a custody suit and upon proof (again, beyond a reasonable
doubt) that he was in fact the biological father, it would then fall to
the court to determine which parent or set of parents could better
serve the long term interests of the child.67
Section four of the Uniform Parentage Act also establishes pre-
sumptions of paternity. When, for example, a man, after a child's
birth, receives a child under the age of majority into his home and
openly holds the child out as his natural child, a presumption arises,
that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that the
man is the natural father of the child.68 Another provision allows for
the establishment of a presumption of paternity when the man pur-
porting to be the natural father acknowledges his paternity of the
questioned child by filing a written statement with the appropriate
court or administrative agency, informing the biological mother of
this public acknowledgement, and no dispute of this acknowledge-
ment occurs. Again, this presumption is to be rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence.69
A liberal construction of these provisions of the Uniform Par-
entage Act could modify the rigidity of the provisions regarding is-
sue born of artificial insemination and thereby enable a surrogate
contract father to establish his paternity. In order to avoid confusion
in both interpretation and implementation of the Uniform Act, how-
ever, it would be wise to modify the Act in such a manner so as to
provide a specific provision or state a specific presumption establish-
ing a mechanism for the biological father to establish his unques-
tioned paternity in surrogate contracts.
VIII. ADDITIONAL POLICY ISSUES
As observed, the parallel relationship between AID and con-
tracts to bear children is inescapable. Yet, while donor identity is
66. Annas, Contracts to Bear a Child- Compassion and Commercialism?, 11 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. Apr. 1981, at 23, 24.
67. Id See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980).
68. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a).
69. Id § 4(b).
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generally assured of confidentiality in heterologous insemination,
the identity of a surrogate mother is generally known by the contract
couple. Appearance, in fact, is often a major consideration, together
with the prospective surrogate's medical history, education level, en-
vironment and cultural background, in making a judgment as to the
suitability of a surrogate. 70 Because of the increased potential for
genetic anomalies in births by women over thirty-five years of age,7 '
this age is usually the cut-off for surrogate candidacy. The availabil-
ity of the pool of candidates is, furthermore, normally limited to wo-
men who are presently married or who have been divorced.72
Single, unwed women are regarded generally as not suitable simply
because their involvement would not only be regarded in some cir-
cles as promoting immorality (and perhaps technically adultery) 73
but as a practical matter, an unproven record of birth successes
might promote a further element of uncertainty for the contracting
parties which is undesirable. The right of a single, unmarried wo-
man to control her own physical autonomy is an ever-evolving con-
cept measured in proportion to the degree of state interest in
preserving the public welfare and morals.74 The right of a married
woman to act or conduct her marital affairs without the informed
consent of her husband, specifically to submit herself to surrogate
mother status, remains an open-ended question.
Perhaps an even more unsettled issue is the extent of the surro-
gate's autonomy during the period of the pregnancy versus the extent
and nature of the right of control of her and the fetus by the biologi-
cal husband and his wife. If, for example, after agreeing to abstain
from uses of alcoholic beverages during the pregnancy, the surrogate
does in fact imbibe on a regular basis, could a court order be ob-
70. Erickson, supra note 59, at 611-13; Harris, supra note 51, at I, col. 1; supra note
29.
71. Robinson, Genetics and Society, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 487, 489 (1971). See also,
G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW, 22 n.6 (1981); Friedman, Legal Implications
of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 92, 100 (1974).
72. Id. See generally, Smith, supra note 24. Interestingly, however, a sperm bank
run by feminists in Oakland, California, has recently opened. It serves all women, re-
gardless of race, marital status, or sexual orientation. The Birth of a Feminist Sperm
Bank: New Social Agendasfor AID, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1983, at 3.
73. See, e.g., Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 257-59 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1921) and
Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (unreported decision of Super. Ct., Cook
County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954) (held that a woman's use of AID without her husband's
consent was adulterous).
74. See generally, Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemi-
nation: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMAN'S L.J. 1 (1981).
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tained to stop such consumption?75 If so, how could it be enforced?
By total restraint (i.e., hospital confinement)? Suppose the surrogate
did not reveal her propensity to consume alcohol (or unprescribed
drugs) and upon birth, the child is born with a genetic impairment or
defect which is determined to be as a direct consequence of the ac-
tions of the surrogate. Could the surrogate be sued for negligence?
Suppose, further, neither the husband nor his wife wish to raise the
defective child as their own, and the surrogate does not wish to
either. Should a penalty be assessed against all concerned parties
because of this "misdeed"? In such a situation, the infant would
likely become a ward of the state, and therefore a responsibility of
the taxpayers if and until an adoption could be arranged.
Other issues arise in the area of physician negligence. If a phy-
sician is negligent in failing to screen adequately a prospective surro-
gate mother candidate and upon birth, the infant is born with a
genetic deficiency, might a suit for malpractice be obtained against
the attending physician or the surrogate? Suppose a surrogate de-
cides to keep the contract baby. Could she in turn sue the biological
father for child support?76 As a practical matter, it would appear
that in a case where a court decreed the biological surrogate mother
had a right to keep her child and assuming the mother had insuffi-
cient funds to support herself and the child that financial support by
the biological father would be in the best interests of the child and of
the state. But, quaere, given this hypothetical, would it not be argua-
bly best for all concerned to have the child in a stable economic en-
vironment with its biological father and his wife instead of being
placed afid raised in the possibly impoverished environment of its
biological mother alone and no adoptive father? Yet another inter-
esting question is raised in the case where the surrogate suffers
mental trauma or a complete breakdown after relinquishing the
baby to the biological father and his wife. Would the surrogate be
able to sue the contracting parents for damages?
Further unanswered issues may arise with changes in the status
of the contracting couple. What if the contracting couple divorced
or one or both died before the surrogate gave birth? What would be
the status of the infant upon birth? Would the contract be voided for
impossibility of performance and the child recognized as illegitimate
75. See generally Comment. Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Pre-
natal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1981).
76. The only recorded "mind change" case only covered the surrogate's desire to
keep her biological child, with no issue of support being raised. Time Mag., June 22,
1981, at 71.
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and a subsequent ward of the state? Obviously, if the biological fa-
ther died, severe difficulty would be encountered in establishing the
paternity of the infant. Assume further that upon the death of the
biological father, the surrogate decided that she wished to keep the
infant that she bore, but the widow wanted her husband's child.
Would Solomonic wisdom be called into play dictating the birth-
mother win out over a widow who might never be able to have a
child?77
In order to anticipate or forestall these complexities and others
that might arise, it is imperative that a tightly drawn contract be exe-
cuted which defines the rights and responsibilities of all parties and
establishes a mechanism or procedure for assessing damages for vio-
lations thereof. Clarity of terms and specification of duties will go
far toward assisting a court to construe the provisions of a contract of
this nature and, at the same time, to determine the intent of the con-
tracting parties. Absent such a controlling instrument and definitive
legislation in the area, it will fall upon the courts to employ a rather
traditional equitable balancing test in determining the merits or de-
merits of each issue in a surrogate contract case; thus, the gravity of
the "harm" (economic, social, personal, religious, etc.) of holding
one particular way according to the plaintiffs case, will be weighed
against the utility of the "good" (economic, social, personal, reli-
gious, etc.) in sustaining defendant's case-in-chief. Fluidity and flex-
ibility, then, become the coordinates of action instead of
predictability and stability.
Inextricably related to this area of concern are various religious
considerations. Indeed, these considerations remain a serious point
of contention to a complete understanding, acceptance, and ad-
vancement of the aspects of the new human genetic technology. An
exegesis or even a mere tentative analysis of them remain beyond the
scope of this article.78 Suffice it to state that from the standpoint of
maintaining its strengths and efficiency of power, religion must meet
change with the same attitude and spirit as does science. Accord-
ingly, while religious principles may be immutable and eternal, the
continued expression of those principles require an open, continual
77. See generally Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Be-
tween Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 149, 157-61
(1980).
78. Smith, Theological Reflections and the New Biology, 48 IND. L.J. 605 (1973).
See also C. MILLER, A SCIENTIST's APPROACH TO RELIGION (1947).
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development that staves off stagnation.7 9
IX. THE EVOLVING CASE LAW
In an "informal" opinion in 1978, relative to the legality of sur-
rogate motherhood status, Wayne County Juvenile Court Judge
James Lincoln, held that a volunteer could bear a child for a couple
to adopt, but that state law forbade any payment of fees to the surro-
gate for her service. 80 Michigan attorney Noel Keane observed that,
in spite of this situation, and owing to the scarcity of so few white
babies for adoption which in turn means a four to five year waiting
period, the demand for surrogates remains undiminished.8 1 After
the publication of Judge Lincoln's informal opinion, the successes of
Debbie, George and Good Friend were made known to the public.
Debbie assisted in the impregnation of Good Friend by inserting
samples of her husband's semen in Friend's reproductive tract and,
now, all four (including the baby) live together.82 It would seem fair
to assume that if an adverse legislative or judicial climate exists for
validating surrogate motherhood, then many clandestine scenarios
comparable to that of Debbie, George and Good Friend will be writ-
ten. As will be seen with the next case, the "informal" opinion by
Judge Lincoln was not given sufficient weight to settle the matter
altogether.
In the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, an opinion of
considerable import and interest was rendered by Judge Roman S.
Gribbs on January 28, 1980.83 Jane Doe, her husband, John, and
Mary Roe, a would-be surrogate mother, sought a summary judg-
ment that, if granted, would have allowed them to execute their
agreement to have Mary conceive a child with John, through artifi-
cial insemination duly administered by a physician, and subse-
quently upon birth to allow the Does to adopt the child. In
consideration for her services, Mary was to have received the sum of
$5,000.00 and medical expenses. At issue was the constitutionality of
two Michigan statutes that made it a criminal offense to "offer, give,
or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value in con-
nection with . . . placing of a child for adoption. a84 The plaintiffs,
79. G. SMITH, supra note 71, at 153. See also HUMAN SEXUALITY-NEw DIREc-
TIONS IN AMERICAN CATHOLIC THOUGHT (1977).
80. Time Mag., June 5, 1978, at 59.
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Doe v. Kelley, 1979-81 RvrR. ON HUM. REPRODUCTION & THE L. II-B-15.
84. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.54, 710.69 (1980 Supp.).
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in addition to seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality as to the
two statutes, sought to enjoin the defendant State Attorney General
from prosecuting them for proceeding with their agreement with
Mary Roe.
Plaintiffs' challenge of the statutes on the ground of unconstitu-
tionality was tied to an argument that urged the court to void the
statute because of its vagueness and, furthermore, because of the
statutes' invasion of their constitutional right of privacy. The court
concluded that for a statute to be violative of Due Process, it must
proscribe conduct that is so vague that an ordinary person of normal
intelligence would be forced to guess at the meaning of the statute
itself. The court concluded that the statute in question was suffi-
ciently direct in order to give fair notice to all those affected by it.85
The second argument in plaintiffs' case was that the statute in
question not only invaded their constitutionally guaranteed right to
privacy, but failed to comply with basic requirements of compelling
state interest and the strict drafting required of statutes that regulate
an act within the privacy right. Acknowledging that only "funda-
mental" rights within the Roe v. Wade privacy doctrine may be so
considered, the court concluded that the specific activities of mar-
riage, which include procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education, were not the bases of plaintiffs' ac-
tion.86 Rather, plaintiffs maintained a selective attack of the statutes
that prohibited the exchange of money or other valuable considera-
tion in the adoptive process. 87 The protection provisions of the stat-
ute used to effect a legal adoption were not challenged. This forced
the court to conclude that a contract that utilized a statutory grant of
authority to effect a child's adoption and provided for valuable com-
pensation in connection therewith, was not within the blanket pro-
tection of the right of privacy.88
The court then proceeded, through dictum, to discuss more fully
the right of privacy issue. 89 Noting that intrusions into the right of
85. Doe v. Kelley, 1979-81 RPTR. ON HUM. REPRODUCTION & THE L. II-B-16, -17.
86. Id. at I1-B-18.
87. Id.
88. Id. at II-B-18, -19.
89. Id. at II-B-19, -20. Regardless of whether a state is obliged to authorize acts of
adoption and establish procedures thereunder for their effectuation, once it has entered
the field and acted, those actions are subject to the imposition of constitutional limita-
tions. Thus, government regulations that have the effect of intruding or manipulating
decisions of single or married individuals regarding family planning, "may be justified
only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those
interests." Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). Consequently,
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privacy may be tolerated when compelling state interests so merit
and when such intrusions are drawn narrowly in order to articulate
the specific state interests at stake, the court observed that even if a
fundamental right of privacy had been applicable, the state's actions
to prevent commercialism in child adoption matters was both proper
and an over-riding legitimate state interest.90 "Baby bartering" was
held to be totally abhorrent to the public policy of the State of Mich-
igan.9 1 Here, specifically, the money that the plaintiffs wished to pay
the surrogate was intended as an inducement for her to conceive a
child not normally intended to be conceived and, as such, would be a
violation of the state's public policy against such acts. Thus, the
court held against the plaintiffs and observed that any change in the
present area of contention would have to be initiated by the
legislature.92
X. A "FIRST" IS ACHIEVED
On November 9, 1980, a baby boy was born in the Louisville,
Kentucky area, becoming the first recorded baby born to a surrogate
mother under contract.93 By a Jefferson County Court order, the fol-
lowing April, the infant was legally adopted by his putative mother
and his biological father. While identities of the new parents were
not disclosed, the facts showed that an Illinois housewife, whose
pseudonym was Elizabeth Kane, was hired for money to carry the
issue of her artificial insemination. After waiting ninety days after
birth, as required by Kentucky law,94 the putative mother filed for
adoption of the infant. Her attorney declared that the adoption or-
der was final and that the lawsuit maintained by the State Attorney
General of Kentucky challenging the legality of the surrogate con-
tract would have no effect.95 Presumably, the State's Attorney was
maintaining his action on a statutory provision that prohibits adver-
when a state enters the field of family planning and seeks to control or implement deci-
sions made therein which are protected by the right of privacy, it is not allowed to struc-
ture conditions that have the effect of excluding certain individuals from the protections
of the statutes in question and depriving them of basic fundamental rights. Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). While a woman has the right to become a surro-
gate mother, to deny her compensation for service appears unjust. "What the state can-
not overtly prohibit, it cannot indirectly outlaw either, A state created obstacle need not
be absolute to be impermissible." Keane, supra note 59, at 163.
90. Doe v. Kelley, 1979-81 RPTR. ON HUM. REPRODUCTION & THE L. II-B-19.
91. Id at II-B-20.
92. Id at II-B-21, -22.
93. Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1981, at A12, col. 1.
94. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.470 (1977).
95. Id
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tising or soliciting children for adoption and accepting any remuner-
ation for procuring any such child for adoptive purposes. No
penalty was specified, however, for violation of this provision. 96
Mrs. Kane, the surrogate, was at age thirty-seven, a mother of
three children and married to a Midwestern executive. She received
less than $10,000 for her services. 97 The issue born of this arrange-
ment thus became the first born through the work of Surrogate
Parenting Associates (SPA), an organization founded in January,
1980, in Louisville, Kentucky. 98 Stated quite simply, the function of
this organization is to act as a match-maker-matching, as such, in-
fertile couples with fertile women willing to bear babies. Fears by
some of eugenic selectivity obviously come to the fore in any opera-
tion of this nature. The potential for "Master Race" making vis-it-vis
a positive eugenic program of matching only the "best" or most de-
sired genetic qualities of a man and surrogate certainly is there; but
surely not of any real concern to the more sophisticated. 99 Interest-
ingly, surrogates normally charge anywhere from $3,000.00 to
$10,000.00 for their services. SPA estimated the average cost in-
volved in a total surrogate program to be anywhere from $13,000.00
to $20,000.00 which covers medical and hospital expenses and the
fees of SPA.100
96. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.590 (1982). In addition to his advisory opinion, 81-18,
the Attorney General maintained an action to enjoin Surrogate Planning Associates, Inc.
from making any further surrogate mother arrangements in the state. Annas, supra note
66, at 25. In Kentucky Attorney General Opinions, 1980-81, Opinion 81-18 states that
(i) any contract agreement involving the surrogate parenting process is illegal under cur-
rent Kentucky laws; (2) a mother is prohibited from giving legally binding consent for
adoption or termination prior to the fifth day after the birth of the child; and (3) no
person, agency or institution may charge a fee or accept renumeration from the procure-
ment of any child. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 199.500(5), 199.601(2), 199.590(2). See Note, In
Defense of Surrogate Parenting A CriticalAna ysis of the Recent Kentucky Experience, 69
Ky. L.J. 877 (1980-81).
In Syrkowski v. Appleyard, the Michigan Court of Appeals held the state's paternity
law could not be used as a vehicle for validating a custody proceeding designed, in turn,
to validate a surrogation contract. 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2260 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19,
1983).
97. Krucoff, supra note 60, at B5, col. 2.
98. Id.
99. See Note, Eugenic Articial Insemination.- A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1850 (1981); Playboy Interview: William Shockley, 27 PLAYBOY MAG. 69 (Aug.
1980). See generally, Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code.- Jurisprudential Conundrums,
64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976).
100. Krucoff, supra note 60, at B5, col. 2. One Michigan attorney, Noel Keane,
charges $3,000.00 to find surrogate mothers. Id. Since Michigan law prohibits paying
for adoptions, the surrogates in Michigan are not paid. Supra note 84. Presumably, a
monetary gift or other personal or real property could be made to a surrogate, however.
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The first known incident of a surrogate mother attempting to
rescind her contract was decided recently by a Superior Court Judge
in Los Angeles, California.' 10 The plaintiff and his wife were unable
to have a family and therefore sought a California widow and
mother of three children to be put under contract to be artificially
inseminated by plaintiff. Although not paid for her services, her
medical expenses were covered. 102 During the pregnancy, the surro-
gate changed her mind and expressed her intent to keep the baby
when born. Plaintiff then sued for custody, but before trial requested
the presiding judge to withdraw his suit. Claiming "extraordinary
publicity" of the fact that his wife was a transsexual would make it
difficult for his son to "lead a normal life," the plaintiff capitulated.
The infant was given his birth mother's surname, but the plaintiff
was listed on the birth certificate as the father and was granted no
visitation rights. The plaintiff's attorney stated that plaintiff might
well wish to reopen the case on the issue of visitation rights. The
presiding judge of the court stated his belief that surrogates should
always be allowed to reconsider and change their minds regarding
such contracts. 103
As one editorialist put it, "The California case is telling us that
this business may be convenient and practical, but that doesn't make
it right. You can take sex out of pregnancy, but you can't take emo-
tions out of parenthood."' 104 The journalist made yet another signifi-
cant observation when she went on to conclude that while deciding
the case on "a best interests of the child" test was proper in custody
disputes, it was not here. Her argument was that since the birth
mother made a greater investment of herself in the child's develop-
ment, as opposed to a mere effortless donation of sperm by the ge-
netic father, afortiori she had a greater stake in the court's decision.
She has donated her body, nine months of her life and become
part of the emotional bond that develops between a mother and
child during pregnancy. If the New York couple loses custody,
they simply will not be getting a child they never had. Should the
baby be taken from the mother, she would be losing a child. 10 5
101. Wash. Post, April 7, 1981, at A7, cots. 1-2; Wash. Post, June 5, 1981, at A6,
col. 1; Time Mag., June 22, 1981, at 71.
102. Mathews, Adoptive Parents Fight Surrogate Motherfor Baby, Wash. Post,
Mar. 23, 1981, at A7, col. 6.
103. Supra notes 100 & 101.
104. Mann, Surrogate Motherhood- The Inevitable Conflict, Wash. Post, Mar. 25,
1981, at CI, col. 1.
105. Id
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In order to become a "certified" surrogate of SPA a woman
must: be married and have borne at least one healthy child; reveal
no transmuttable genetic disorder and be in good health as a conse-
quence of a genetic screening and a physical examination; submit
herself and her husband to a successful evaluation by two psychia-
trists as well as one psychologist; be abstemious of alcohol, drugs
and tobacco during the length of her pregnancy and furthermore
agree to terminate all parental rights to the child upon birth.' °6
Upon request, and with the aid of a computer, SPA endeavors to
match both physical and cultural characteristics. In addition to this
service, the fee charged includes the following: all medical and
transportation expenses incurred by the surrogate; a life insurance
policy for the family of the surrogate, in the event death should oc-
cur during pregnancy or at childbirth; a financial arrangement for
the infant consisting of either a life insurance policy or testamentary
disposition should father and his wife, the putative mother, die
before the child is born; and a medical test of the child's paternity
and payment of the legal fees incurred by the surrogate. The SPA,
interestingly, requires that a prospective surrogate retain her own le-
gal counsel in order to represent her and review the contract. 07 The
applicants to SPA must certify their marriage, and submit to labora-
tory blood tests, a semen analysis of the husband to confirm fertility,
and a complete medical report of both husband and wife.' 08
XI. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO SURROGATE
PARENTHOOD
In retrospect, it can be seen that three alternative legal ap-
proaches or strategies may be developed by states in order to meet
the critical challenges of surrogate motherhood. First, specific legis-
lation that outlaws the practice coupled with stringent enforcement
codes could be enacted. This would have the obvious effect of forc-
ing a real "black market" to develop, particularly since the process
of becoming a surrogate mother is not an exceptionally difficult one
to learn. Furthermore, the enforcement of a law forbidding surro-
gate motherhood in all forms would be difficult as a matter of policy
to enforce. For example, it would be rather distasteful to many to
exact a penalty for becoming a mother, or to impose a prison sen-
tence for promoting its advancement and implementation. Such
106. Supra note 60.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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would be offensive and morally distasteful to the very policy that
both favors and recognizes the family as the bulwark of society.
Second, a legislative program designed to license the procedure
and the surrogates participating in it as well as to protect the health
and well being of the child, together with the safety of the surrogate,
could be enacted. Legislation of this order and dimension would
include provisions shaping the rights and determining the extent of
the liabilities of the contracting parents in the surrogate compact vis-
a-vis the infant. Consideration would, additionally, be given to
shaping the sphere of responsibility for various types of error which
intermediaries (doctors, lawyers or mere friends of the family) might
commit in facilitating the whole process. Courses of action to be
taken in many of the other specific policy areas discussed previously
would be ideally either tackled legislatively or delegated to adminis-
trative decision making by a licensing board constituted in order to
set, enforce and implement standards considered relevant. The Ken-
tucky experience, structured by the SPA would be a model for legis-
lative design, inasmuch as the standards and policy areas delineated
by the Association in processing a request for surrogate mothering
are both comprehensive and equitable in their design and
utilization. 1o9
A third and final strategy would be to purposely allow the very
concept or principle of surrogate mothers to develop through case-
by-case judicial determination. Obviously, this would yield a crazy
patchwork quilt similar to those early and disparate cases dealing
with artificial insemination. 0 In some jurisdictions, regretably, this
very process concerning artificial insemination in fact still contin-
ues. " I Judicial activity will of necessity be the order of the day if the
109. Action is already being pursued by the Science and Family Committee of the
Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, chaired by Professor George J.
Annas, toward the goal of developing a set of controlling principles in the area as well as
possible model legislation regarding surrogate mothers and in vitro fertilizations. Annas,
supra note 66.
110. See, e.g., Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1921); Doornbos v.
Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (unreported decision of Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill., Dec.
13, 1954) where the use of AID by married women without their husband's consent was
held to be an act of adultery. In Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(Sup. Ct. 1963), the issue born of AID was held to be illegitimate. Yet, in In re Adoption
of Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1964), it was held that a
husband's approval of his wife's use of AID implied a promise to pay for the child. And,
in In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973) and
People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968) it was held AID
children were legitimate.
111. The very fact that not all jurisdictions have uniformly adopted legislation
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state legislatures assume their normal passive role in matters of great
moment and controversy; but the preferred approach would be a leg-
islative one.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
If regulated adequately, the "legitimization" of the status of sur-
rogate mothers, involving legislative or judicial interpretation, and
the corresponding validation of contracts to bear a child, present no
insuperable problems to society. It is by realizing the vast dimen-
sions of the twenty-first century and by preparing for them now that
the law assumes its rightful posture as a predictive, rather than
resultative vector of force in a scheme of modem living. Any new
change or departure in custom and practice in the philosophies and
coordinate actions of "new" biological and technological advances
as they impact on social life initially elicit a response of horrified
negation. Subsequently with time, this shades into a negation of the
acts without horror; then comes a slow, yet nonetheless, perceptible
type of curiosity, study and evaluation. This evolutionary thinking
process concludes with a slow but steady acceptance and establish-
ment of a new norm or construct."12
It is evident that artificial insemination is becoming more
widely accepted and approved as a means of family development.
The parallels and, indeed, linkage between artificial fathering and
surrogate mothering are so obvious that it can be but hoped that wise
judges and informed legislatures will give official recognition to this
method which is also designed to further and promote the basic unit
of society-the family.
conferring legitimacy upon issue born of AID is pertinent to this point. Cf supra note 21.
Interestingly, Connecticut has gone so far as to prohibit physicians from performing AID
upon married women unless the husband gives his written consent. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-69g(b) (1975). Yet, another example of the disparity of response to the AID phe-
nomenon is seen in the judicial declaration that a best interests of the AID child test vis-
&-vis the issue of its legitimacy, necessitated a finding of legitimacy even though the
parents of the child are not married.
112. S. KLEEGMAN, S, KAUFMAN, INFERTILITY IN WOMEN 178 (1966).
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APPENDIX
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRI-
CIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS CONCERNING SURROGATE
MOTHERING
1 13
I. Initiation of Surrogate Arrangements
A. When approached by a patient interested in surrogation,
the physician should, as in all other aspects of medical
care, be certain there is a full discussion of ethical and
medical risks, benefits and alternatives, many of which
have been expressed in this paper.
B. A physician may justifiably decline to participate in sur-
rogate motherhood arrangements.
C. If a physician decides to become involved in an arrange-
ment for surrogation,
1. The physician should be assured that appropriate
screening procedures are utilized for the contracting
couple and in the selection of the surrogate. Such
screening may include appropriate fertility studies
and genetic screening.
2. The physician should receive only the usual compen-
sation for obstetric and gynecologic services. Refer-
ral fees and other arrangements for financial gain
beyond the usual fees for medical services are
inappropriate.
3. The physician should not participate in a surrogate
program where the financial arrangements are likely
to exploit any of the parties.
II. Care of Pregnant Surrogates
A. When a woman seeks medical care for an established
pregnancy, regardless of the method of conception, she
should be cared for as any other obstetric patient or re-
ferred to a qualified physician who will provide that
care.
B. The surrogate mother should be considered the source of
consent with respect to clinical intervention and manage-
ment of the pregnancy. Confidentiality between the phy-
sician and patient should be maintained. If other parties,
such as the adoptive parents, are to play a role in deci-
113. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Recommendations
Concerning Surrogate Mothering (May 10, 1983).
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sion making, the parameters should be clearly deline-
ated, with the agreement of the patient.
